Fire Where There Is No Flame:  The Constitutionality of Single-Sex Classrooms in the Commonwealth by Burgin, Frances Elizabeth
William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice
Volume 13 | Issue 3 Article 7
"Fire Where There Is No Flame:" The
Constitutionality of Single-Sex Classrooms in the
Commonwealth
Frances Elizabeth Burgin
Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Frances Elizabeth Burgin, "Fire Where There Is No Flame:" The Constitutionality of Single-Sex
Classrooms in the Commonwealth, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 821 (2007),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol13/iss3/7
"FIRE WHERE THERE IS NO FLAME:" THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SINGLE-SEX CLASSROOMS IN
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If there is any misleading concept,
it is that of "coeducation"...
-Adrienne Rich'
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INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Virginia, once chastised for excluding
students based on gender from institutions of higher education,2 now
offers single-sex opportunities in public secondary schools.3 These
initiatives, encouraged by the No Child Left Behind Act,4 bring the
Commonwealth back into the debate on the constitutionality of state-
supported single-sex education. This note argues the Commonwealth's
justifications for separating students based on gender in public sec-
ondary schools can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
1. ADRIENNE RICH, Taking Women Students Seriously, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND
SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966-1978, 237, 241 (1979).
2. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
3. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, http://www. singlesexschools
.org/schools-classrooms.htm#22 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) (summarizing the Common-
wealth's single-sex schools and classrooms).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23) (Supp. IV 2005).
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The Supreme Court's current articulation of the constitutional
standard' for single-sex education emerged out of a challenge to the
Commonwealth's flagship military institution, the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI).6 While United States v. Virginia mandated the ad-
mission of women to an all-male military college,7 it should not be
read as a prohibition against single-sex classrooms in public second-
ary schools.8 The Court, speaking through Justice Ginsburg,9 recog-
nized the potential "pedagogical benefits"'" of single gender education.
While articulating the standard for single-sex education, Virginia
left unresolved the question of whether public secondary schools as
opposed to colleges would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." As the sole dissenter to Virginia, Justice
Scalia predicted the majority's decision would kill single-sex public
education initiatives across the country. 2 Despite his predictions,
recent trends in public education indicate a resurgence of interest
in single-sex schools.' 3
Renewed interest in single-sex education 4 emerges out of the
continuing debate concerning the best way to educate the nation's
5. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33 (indicating "a heightened review standard" that
"[fl]ocus[es] on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity... [in] determining
whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive."'); see also Denise C.
Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the
Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381,384 (noting
the Court's "language suggests that the goal of intermediate scrutiny is to identify and
strike down rules that maintain the traditional hierarchy of men over women, rather than
to determine which differences between the sexes can justify their disparate treatment").
6. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523.
7. Id. at 557.
8. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX
SCHOOLING 161 (2003).
9. Notably, the Court spoke through Justice Ginsburg, a fierce advocate of women's
rights. See id. ('The Court's spokesperson was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a seasoned
veteran of the gender wars.").
10. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996).
11. See Laura Fortney, Comment, Public Single-Sex Elementary Schools: "Separate
But Equal" in Gender Fifty Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 35 U. TOL. L. REV.
857, 860 (2004) ("[No case] offers a substantive analysis that can be applied to public single-
sex elementary schools with 'separate but equal' facilities for the genders."); Jolee Land,
Note, Not Dead Yet: The Future of Single-Sex Education After United States v. Virginia,
27 STETSON L. REv. 297, 297 (1997) (stating "[w]hat the majority decision did not do, how-
ever, is clarify the opinion's ramifications for other forms of single sex education").
12. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "single sex public
education [would be] functionally dead").
13. See Galen Sherwin, Single-Sex Schools and the Antisegregation Principle, 30 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 35 (2006) ("Despite [Justice Scalia's] prediction, single-sex
schools across the country have continued to operate and, indeed, have even flourished.").
14. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 389 (noting a "resurgence of interest in single sex
schooling - particularly on the K-12 level").
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youth." In reaction to a perceived lack of educational opportunities,
President George W. Bush pushed for pedagogical experimentation,
including funding for single-gender classrooms. 6 During debates
on the Senate floor, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton rose to defend
the proposal, advocating against "any obstacle to providing single-sex
choice within the public school system."'7 The No Child Left Behind
Act, with unlikely advocates on both sides of the political spectrum, 8
opened the door to educational experimentation and encouraged
school districts across the nation to begin offering single-sex oppor-
tunities for students. 9 During the 2005-2006 school year, over 193
school districts across the country offered single-sex classrooms within
the context of coeducational schools.2 ° In 2006 the Department of
Education promulgated rules opening the door for school districts to
create voluntary single-sex classrooms.2" Effective November 2006,
these regulations potentially create an influx of single-sex classrooms
across the country.22
Six years after the Supreme Court admonished Virginia for
discriminatory practices, 23 elementary school districts within the
Commonwealth,24 encouraged by the No Child Left Behind Act,
15. See Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Separate But Equal Education in the Context of Gender,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 785, 785 (2005) (noting that, despite the rarity of single-sex
classrooms, they inspire heated debate); Sherwin, supra note 13, at 36.
16. See, e.g., Jane Gross, Dividing the Sexes, for the Tough Years: A Coed School Offers
Boys and Girls Separate Classes in Grades 6-8, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at B1 (noting the
greater "flexibility to experiment with single-sex education in the No Child Left Behind
Act, the initiative pushed by President Bush'); see also Diana Jean Schemo, Administration
Proposes Same-Sex-School Option: Underlying Criterion is Equal Opportunities, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A16 (reporting the "Bush administration has proposed regulations
giving public school districts new freedom to create same sex classes and schools as long
as 'substantially equal' opportunities are also provided for the excluded sex"); Sherwin,
supra note 13, at 35-36 (noting that "politicians at the national level have embraced the
trend toward single-sex education as well").
17. 147 CONG. REC. S5943 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Clinton).
18. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Feminist Voices in the Debate Over Single-Sex
Schooling: Finding Common Ground, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 63, 66 (2004) ("Single sex
education defies conventional political labels. It attracts support from social and religious
conservatives.... [and] on the other hand the response... [ among liberals] has been far
more mixed. In fact, the debate created some atypical alliances ... ").
19. Fortney, supra note 11, at 859 ("It seems that single-sex elementary schools are
slowly infiltrating the country.").
20. Id.
21. Diane Jean Schemo, Change in Federal Rules Backs Single-Sex Public Education,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at Al.
22. Id.
23. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).
24. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, supra note 3 (indicating
that in 2006-2007 eight schools in Virginia experimented with single-sex classrooms:
Mechanicsville Elementary School, Cedar Lee Middle School, Bailey Bridge Middle School,
Henderson Middle School, Williamsburg Middle School, Achievable Dream Academy in
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again started experimenting with single-sex initiatives.25 This note
examines the school districts in the Commonwealth offering single-
sex classrooms within the context of coeducational secondary schools.
26
Despite separating students because of their gender, this note argues
these single-sex programs withstand constitutional scrutiny.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The Supreme Court's current constitutional review evolved out
of years of encountering single-sex education across the nation." In
confronting gender classifications, the Court considers the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause 28 and the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause.29 The Constitution's mandate of equal protection
eliminates rules maintaining a bias for one sex over another3 ° The
Commonwealth's current educational initiatives must be examined
within this constitutional context in order to determine whether they
will survive judicial scrutiny.
Gender-based state action requires heightened scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment.31 A government action remains uncon-
stitutional unless it "serve[s] important governmental objectives."32
Further, the government's action must be "substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."33 This intermediate standard seems
purposefully positioned between the Court's lenient rational basis
Newport News, Spratley Middle School, and Patrick Henry Elementary School).
25. See SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 176 ("The VMI decision did not sound the death
knell for single-sex education. In fact, it left considerable room for well-designed programs
with clearly stated and non-biased objectives.").
26. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, supra note 3.
27. Compare Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per
curiam) (affirming single-sex education in the school district of Philadelphia), with Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (mandating admission of men into an
all-women's nursing program), and Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519 (holding that the Virginia
Military Institute must admit women into its all-male programs).
28. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. The Fifth Amendment provides "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. " U.S. CONST. amend V.
30. Morgan, supra note 5, at 459-60 ("The goal of identifying and eliminating rules
that function to maintain the traditional hierarchy of men over women, is what the Equal
Protection Clause requires.").
31. Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976) (striking down a statute that discriminated
against the right of young men to buy 3.2% non-intoxicating beer at the same age that
young women were allowed to purchase it).
32. Id. at 197.
33. Id.
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review and fatal strict scrutiny.34 Sex discrimination jurisprudence
focuses on state actions that distinguish between the sexes, with the
Court condemning actions that "generally reinforce stereotypical and
over-generalized notions about the abilities of men and women."35
Over fifty years ago in Brown v. Board of Education,3" the
Supreme Court recognized states' significant interest in educating
children without discrimination. 7 Education had become a battle
ground for racial segregation, with the Court intervening to mandate
separating students into so-called "equal" facilities would not pass
constitutional scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.3" While
initially applied in the context of racial segregation,39 it is unclear
whether the principle of "separate as inherently unequal" would also
implicate gender-segregated classrooms.4" On its face the analogy
seems sound. In Brown, however, the "state could offer no pedagogical
justification for the segregation."'" Instead, the segregation in Brown
was based solely on an attempt to maintain racial hierarchies.42
Current single-sex educational opportunities operate in a far differ-
ent context, with attendance voluntary instead of mandated by the
state.43 Rather than attempting to instill "inferiority" between the seg-
regated classes, the current proposals hope to "help students realize
34. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women's 'Tull Citizenship" A
Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 759-60 (2002)
(noting that intermediate review is "situated between rational basis analysis, which almost
always upholds the constitutionality of challenged actions, and strict scrutiny, which
almost always strikes practices down").
35. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 131 (1994) (refusing to recognize
"invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women"); see also Amanda Koman, Note, Urban, Single-Sex Public Secondary Schools:
Advancing Full Development of the Talent and Capacities of Americas Young Women,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507,537 (1998) ("In the context of public education, the Supreme
Court has examined only cases that involved gender classifications that perpetuated the
stereotypes of women's dependency.").
36. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("In the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.").
37. Id. at 493 (noting it is the "very foundation of good citizenship").
38. Id. at 483.
39. See SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 116 (noting that "the Supreme Court's unanimous
and far reaching decision on racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education became
a guiding force in breaking down social and political barriers that historically excluded
certain groups, including women, from equal opportunity").
40. See Gary J. Simson, Separate But Equal and Single Sex Schools, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 443, 443 (2005) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court has yet to resolve the
issue in regard to public secondary and elementary schools).
41. SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 119.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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their full potential."" Education remains a significant governmental
function, however the Court has only articulated a clear standard
for single-sex public higher education facilities.4"
II. EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION
While the Court established its clearest articulation of sex-based
classifications in public education with the Virginia decision, several
other cases also were instrumental in creating this level of review.
Over time, in the cases leading up to Virginia, the Court clarified the
standard of review required for single-sex education.
The first case to reach the Court on sex-segregated public
education was Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia.46 In
Vorchheimer, the Court faced a challenge to a Philadelphia school
district's practice of "maintaining single-sex male and female acade-
mies" for gifted students.47 The Third Circuit approved the practice,
noting in particular the "voluntary and not mandatory" nature of the
programs.4" The Supreme Court could not decide the case; splitting
four-to-four in Vorchheimer, without issuing an opinion.49 The decision
allowed Philadelphia to continue the single-sex schools; ° it would
take five years before another challenge would reach the Court.
Ironically, the first time the Supreme Court issued an opinion in-
volving single-sex education revolved around the exclusion of men.51
While sex exclusion historically disadvantaged women, the Court con-
sidered the issue as it related to a male student excluded from an all
female program." In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan a
male applicant challenged the admissions policy of a state nursing
school for women. 3 Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court struck
down the policy noting Mississippi's purported purposes did not seem
44. Id.
45. See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-
TermConsequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451,455 (1999) ("Decisions
... over the past quarter of a century offer no clear guidance on the constitutionality of
single-sex education in its current forms: voluntary single-sex classes or schools .. .
46. 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
47. Levit, supra note 45, at 456.
48. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1976), affd
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
49. Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703.
50. Id.
51. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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sincere54 and therefore were not persuasive.5 Mississippi failed to
show that women were disadvantaged or lacked leadership positions
in nursing. 6 Rather than compensatory, the state's policy of "exclud-
ing males from admission to the school of nursing tend[ed] to perpet-
uate the stereotyped view of nursing as exclusively a woman's job."57
For these reasons, the Court mandated Mississippi open the college
to men." The Court's articulation of stereotyped views of gender
would resurface again in Virginia."
III. KIRSTEIN V. UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA:
A PRECURSOR TO VIRGINIA
Before Virginia, the Commonwealth had to consider the impact
of single-sex admissions policies for its colleges and universities. °
In 1970, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia heard a suit by four women demanding admission to the
University of Virginia.61 In Kirsten v. University of Virginia a district
court determined the Commonwealth could not discriminate against
women on the basis of sex.62 In particular, the district court noted the
University of Virginia's educational amenities could not be matched
by any other institution within the Commonwealth.63 Therefore, the
Commonwealth had to open the institution to women as well as
men.64 The district court made this decision without using the later
articulated standard of heightened scrutiny.65 Reasoning that no
other institution within the Commonwealth offered the same edu-
cational opportunities as the University of Virginia, the district court
54. Id. 723-24, 730. Mississippi proposed the nursing program "compensate[d] for
discrimination against women.... Id. at 727.
55. Id. at 727.
56. Id. at 729.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 731.
59. See Levit, supra note 45, at 459 ("The Hogan Court expressly declined to deter-
mine whether single-sex education itself was unconstitutional; the Court limited its holding
to the narrow issue of whether an all-female admissions policy could operate as an affir-
mative action program at a nursing school.").
60. SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 152 (noting that courts two decades earlier forced the
Commonwealth to admit women into the University of Virginia, one of the premier insti-
tutions in the Commonwealth).
61. Kirstein v. Univ. of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (D.C. Va. 1970).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id.
65. See Levit, supra note 45, at 456 (stating that after finding a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of equal protection, the "Court decided the case
without the benefit of heightened scrutiny").
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recognized women could not be given an equal experience in any
other location in the Commonwealth.66 Within the opinion, the judges
explicitly noted they were "urged to go further" than just opening the
admissions policies of the University of Virginia.67 The district court
knew the Commonwealth operated VMI under similar practices, but
refused to clarify whether it too would be coeducational under the
constitution's grant of equal protection.' The district court, pondering
VMI, wondered if "women [were] to be admitted on an equal basis ....
[were] they to wear uniforms and [be] taught to bear arms?"69 The
Supreme Court would tackle this lingering question" in United States
v. Virginia, when the Commonwealth's continued experiment with
single-sex education would again become the focus of litigation.
IV. ARTICULATING THE CURRENT STANDARD:
UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
Almost fifteen years after Hogan and more than twenty years
after Kirsten, litigation forced the Commonwealth to consider single-
sex education at VMI.7 United States v. Virginia originated from a
suit "filed on behalf of an unnamed woman, who, upon graduation
from a Northern Virginia high school was denied admission" to VMI.72
The suit argued that the male-only admission policy violated the
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. " The Department
of Justice sought to force the state-supported college7 4 to open its
doors to women by "enjoining VMI to consider females as applicants
to its undergraduate program."75 The resulting litigation sought to
eviscerate a long history of female exclusion from Virginia's military
66. See William Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of
Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 27, 54 (1997) ('The Court
went on to describe those opportunities uniquely available in Charlottesville in terms of
two factors - curriculum and prestige .. ")(internal citation omitted).
67. Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (1970).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Levit, supra note 45, at 456 ("One of the court's primary concerns was the effect
such a broad ruling would have on Virginia's military institution. This question had to
wait twenty-six years for an answer in the VMI litigation.").
71. SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 150 (noting that "similar to Hogan, [Virginia] arrived
cloaked in a set of facts that bore but a bare resemblance to current single-sex initiatives).
72. Frank Wolfe, U.S. Fights Wilder on VMI Motion, WASH. TIMES, May 1, 1990, at B3.
73. Id.
74. Peter Baker, U.S. Files Its VMl Lawsuit: Action Seeks to Force Admission of Women,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1990, at C1.
75. Jay Taylor, U.S. Takes VMIto Mat on Coed Issue, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1990, at
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institution;76 it also had major implications for single-sex education
across the nation.
The trial lasted six days with expert witnesses testifying on be-
half of both parties.77 Ultimately the district court ruled in favor of
VMI, finding classifications based on sex must be coupled with an
exceedingly persuasive justification.7" The district court noted single-
sex education "yields substantial benefits." 9 By maintaining the the
status quo at VMI, the Commonwealth added diversity to "an other-
wise coeducational system." Finally, the district court noted this
"diversity was enhanced" by the adversarial instructional methods
employed at VMI.° This "distinctive method '" would be destroyed
by the admittance of women. In the eyes of the district court, the
Commonwealth had provided sufficient justification to pass consti-
tutional muster; the district court allowed it to continue denying
women admission to the Institute.82
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, noting the
Commonwealth did not put forth sufficient justification to maintain
the program.83 On remand, the Commonwealth had to design an
appropriate remedy.' The Commonwealth was given three options:
"admit women to VMI; establish parallel institutions or programs;
or abandon state support, leaving VMI free to pursue its policies as
a private institution."5 The Commonwealth took the remedial ap-
proach 6 rather than abandoning state support and started a second
program designed exclusively for women. Despite purporting to pro-
duce citizen soldiers, the program differed drastically from VMI in
"academic offerings, methods of education, and financial resources."'
Further, the program was located on the campus of a private women's
college, Mary Baldwin College, located in a different town. 9 The
Commonwealth brought this remedial approach to the district court,
76. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996).
77. Id. at 523.
78. Id. at 524.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 525 (1996).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 525-26.
86. Id. at 526
87. Id.; see also Simson, supra note 40, at 445 ("rhe program was almost laughably
unequal to VMI, more resembling a finishing school than the grueling, physically and
mentally exhausting program of VMI. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
characterized the program as 'distinctly inferior."') (internal citation omitted).
88. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 526 (1996).
89. Id.
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which approved the plan."° A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, setting the stage for the Supreme Court's intervention.91
The United States Supreme Court faced two issues: did the
Commonwealth's practice of excluding women from VMI violate equal
protection12 and if so, what remedy it grant?93 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the Court, indicated a reviewing court must determine
"whether the proffered justification is exceedingly persuasive."' Meet-
ing this heavy burden, Justice Ginsburg noted, "rest[ed] entirely on
the state."95 The Commonwealth's justification had to be "genuine,
not hypothesized or invented" when the threat of litigation arose.96
Instead the justification had to be specific, rather than relying on
"overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences" of the genders.97 Inherent differences between the sexes
were for celebrating, Justice Ginsburg noted, not for "denigration of
the members of either sex."9" These classifications could be used to
"compensate women'99 for past wrongs but not to "create or perpetu-
ate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.' ' °
In applying the new standard, the Court held the Commonwealth
did not establish an exceedingly persuasive justification for denying
women the opportunity to study at VMI. 10 ' The remedy constructed
by the Commonwealth did "not cure the constitutional violation."'0 2
The Court held that "women seeking and fit for a VMI-quality edu-
cation cannot be offered anything less, under the Commonwealth's
obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection."'0 3 As a result
the Court commanded VMI to open its doors to female cadets.0 4 The
90. Id. at 528.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 530-31.
93. Id.
94. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
95. Id. (requiring the State to show "at least that the [challenged] classification
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives") (internal citations
omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. ("Supposed 'inherent differences' are no longer accepted as a ground for race
or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men and women, however,
are enduring .. ") (internal citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 557.
104. Id. at 558; see also SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 162-63 ('The Court... stopped
short of renouncing all gender-based classifications, leaving open the door to single-sex
schools under certain conditions."); Morgan, supra note 5, at 458-59 (stating the Court
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Commonwealth's 150 year experiment with a single-sex military
academy for men ended the next school year as VMI prepared to
admit women into its classes.05
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT: PREDICTING THE DEATH OF
SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
As the sole dissenter in Virginia, Justice Scalia argued that the
Court's decision "ensure[d] that single-sex education is functionally
dead."'" The majority, Justice Scalia reasoned, ensured all forms of
"single sex public education [would be] unconstitutional."'' 7 The
Court, he argued, "created the illusion that government officials in
some future case [would] have a clear shot at justifying some sort of
single-sex public education."'0 ° In Justice Scalia's opinion, the major-
ity's reasoning in Virginia left the door open for further challenges
to single sex education. The opinion, he thought, left single-sex schools
vulnerable to attack and potential extinction.0 9
Virginia clarified the Court's constitutional standard as it re-
lated to single-sex education in higher education;"0 it did not fatally
impact America's experiment with single-sex education."'
VI. A NEW GENERATION OF SINGLE-SEX EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001112 authorizes creativity in
solving the nation's educational troubles, including the allowance
for "single-gender schools and classrooms.""' 3 These regulations en-
compass the Supreme Court's recent precedents, providing that once
a recipient of federal funds decides to establish a single-sex classroom
or institution, it must offer a "substantially equal" opportunity for the
in "Virginia left important questions unanswered. Does the Constitution require co-
education in public schools? If not, how should judges distinguish between constitutionally
permissible and constitutionally impermissible single-sex public schools and programs?").
105. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558.
106. Id. at 596; see also Morgan, supra note 5, at 381-82 (stating that applying "strict
scrutiny has almost always proved fatal and that some contend that Virginia spells the
end of single-sex public education in this country").
107. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996).
108. Id. at 596.
109. Id.
110. See SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 176.
111. Id. ("The VMI decision did not sound the death knell for single-sex education. In
fact, it left considerable room for well-designed programs with clearly stated and non-
biased objectives.").
112. Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 501, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23) (Supp. IV 2005) (listing the new innovative programs).
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other sex.'14 In determining whether the opportunity is "substantially
equal" the Department of Education will consider the "aggregate
benefits provided by each school as a whole.""' 5
School districts, under No Child Left Behind, are creating a new
generation of single-sex schools and classrooms.'16 These classrooms
attempt to target students who will benefit the most from separating
the sexes."" The same justifications traditionally proffered for single-
sex education do not apply to the Act's new single-sex initiatives." 8
Old justifications tend to "steer students to traditional gender roles."" 9
The new programs established under the Act cannot implicate any
historic inferiorities between the sexes to withstand constitutional
scrutiny."' Instead, the new programs cater to the educational re-
quirements of each sex. 2' The single-sex initiatives should seek to
establish equality between the sexes, rather than play into negative
stereotypes.'22 In particular, separate classrooms for women cannot
be "based on stereotypes about girls' underachievement.' 23
The No Child Left Behind Act allows school districts to experi-
ment with new learning techniques, backed by federal funding, in
the hopes that America's educational system will improve.'24 The
114. Id.
115. 34 C.F.R. § 134 (c)(3)(ii). The factors include:
[t]he policies and criteria of admission; the educational benefits provided,
including the quality, range, and content of curriculum and other services
and quality and availability of books, instructional materials, and technology;
the quality and range of extra-curricular offerings; the qualifications of
faculty and staff; geographic accessibility; and the quality, accessibility and
availability of facilities and resources.
Id.
116. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 383 (stating this "new generation of single-sex schools
and programs is more likely to satisfy" constitutional scrutiny. Advocates "of those schools
are more likely to try to match their use of a single-sex pedagogy to a specific educational
goal and to be able to demonstrate that the pedagogy actually helps achieve that goal").
117. See Karen Stabiner, Single Sex Schools Deserve Support, in EDUCATION: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 98 (Mary E. Williams et al. eds., 2005) (noting that without public single-sex
educational opportunities, indigent students, standing to gain the most from single-sex
environments, could not afford the benefits offered by single-sex private schools).
118. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 396; see also Allison M. Otto, Education Law Chapter:
Single-Sex Education, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 353, 353 (2004) ("Single-sex education in the
United States originated in a society that valued education only for males.").
119. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 396.
120. See SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 177.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Erin L. Logsden, "No Child Left Behind" and the Promotion of Single-Sex
Education in Primary and Secondary Schools: Shattering the Glass Ceilings Perpetuated
by Coeducation, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 293 (2003) (stating that the No Child Left Behind
Act "enables America's public schools to receive record levels of funding from the federal
government, and creates unprecedented levels of accountability to ensure that those funds
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provisions included in the Act help ensure all students, regardless
of their economic background, may be afforded the ability to partake
in single-sex learning environments. 125 Parents can enroll their chil-
dren in single-sex classrooms in public schools, without having to pay
private tuition.126 In order to improve public education in America,
the No Child Left Behind Act created a dramatic new choice. 27
VII. EXCEEDINGLY PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION
The Court in Virginia articulated a standard that called for an
exceedingly persuasive justification for separation of the sexes in a
public education setting.128 Any school system attempting to promul-
gate single-sex education would have to provide an exceedingly per-
suasive justification for the program. 29
Inherent differences between the sexes are often offered as a jus-
tification for separating the sexes. 3 ° Generally, the "most prevalent
are producing real results to help every child in America receive a quality education").
125. Id. at 296 (finding that "[b]y shattering the 'educational glass ceiling' and allowing
students of all socio-economic backgrounds the opportunity to experience the benefits of
single-sex learning," American society will benefit from better educated students); James
M. Sullivan, Note, The Single Sex Education Choice Facing School Districts After No Child
Left Behind Is Not the One Congress Intended, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 301 (2003)
("It is difficult to dispute that there is a substantial educational achievement gap between
students from high-income families and students from low-income families.").
126. See Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching for the Silver Lining: Constructing a
Nonremedial Yet "Exceedingly Persuasive"Rationale for Single Sex Educational Programs
in Public Schools 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 367, 368 (2001) ("Vithout the financial resources to
pay tuition, the opportunity to learn in a single-gender environment is all but impossible
for the neediest of children.").
127. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524, 534, 546 (1996); Kay Bailey
Hutchison, The Lesson of Single-Sex Public Education: Both Successful and Constitutional,
50 AM. U. L. REv. 1075, 1076 (2001) ("To save our public schools, we must be more creative
and expand the options for such schools - to give parents more choices to fit the needs
of each child.").
128. See Levit, supra note 45, at 451 (indicating that Courts during the last quarter
century offer "no clear guidance on the constitutionality of single-sex education in its
current forms: voluntary single-sex classes or schools, with parallel programs for the
other sex equipped with substantially (or precisely) equal resources").
129. Id. at 426 ("Those defending single-sex programs face a stringent burden of con-
stitutional justification."); see also Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence
of Choice and Diversity in Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455,
476 (noting a higher constitutional threshold requiring assessment of "both theoretical
justifications and available empirical evidence").
130. See Logsden, supra note 124, at 295 (noting that Virginia clarifies that "separate
is not inherently unequal" in regard to gender and that gender classifications allow for
inherent differences between the sexes, for example "there is nothing unconstitutional
about providing for separate male and female restrooms in public places") ; see also
Hurd, supra note 66, at 67 (indicating that when school districts can prove "special needs
for single-sex education" then they have a valid constitutional argument. The absence
of a program for the opposite sex would not effect the constitutionality of the program).
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justification for single-sex education is the supposed difference be-
tween boys' and girls' learning styles."'' The learning distinction be-
tween genders was a justification considered by the Court in Virginia.
The Commonwealth "relied on theories put forward by such scholars
as Carol Gilligan on the difference in rational styles and psychological
development between men and women. 132 The Court was ultimately
not "persuaded that the need to address these differences represented
an interest important enough in itself to justify sex segregation.' 33
In order to meet this standard, it might be necessary for a school dis-
trict to provide empirical evidence. Numerous research studies create
a distinction between the learning styles of the sexes, but many ex-
perts have questioned these conclusions.3 An exceedingly persua-
sive justification could be found in "improving academic achievement
generally."'135 The fit between the means and the ends would have to
be tight though, as "the most difficult hurdle facing supporters of
single-sex education is to establish a causal relationship between
single-sex schools and educational improvement.' '1 36
Another potential justification revolves around remedial mea-
sures. The Court in Virginia stated that if the State sought "to com-
pensate women for particular economic disabilities they have suf-
fered," remedial measures might be justified under the Constitution. 137
In secondary schools, empirical evidence suggests a "gap in academic
achievement and self-esteem between girls and boys in science and
math" based on years of women not being pushed to succeed in those
subjects. 138 It seems likely that separate classrooms for girls in math
and sciences would be held to be constitutional, so long as they were
substantially equal to those offered to boys.'39
131. See Sherwin, supra note 13, at 57; see also Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, Of
Two Minds: Single-Sex Education and The Search for Gender Equality in K-12 Public
Schooling, 14 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 289, 293 (noting a rekindled interest in single sex
schools, especially for girls, "fueled by research and reports that schools 'shortchange'
girls").
132. See Sherwin, supra note 13, at 57.
133. Id.
134. Campbell & Wahl, supra note 131, at 308 ("[It [is] clear that significant variables
[have] not been addressed or examined in depth, and that well constructed research studies
could modify this conclusion.").
135. Sherwin, supra note 13, at 59.
136. Id. at 61.
137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
138. Sherwin, supra note 13, at 59.
139. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom: Law and Policy
in the Debate Over All-Female Math and Science Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 1, 7 (1998) (stating "girls-only math classes should not run afoul of the law
as long as they are optional and substantially equal to those offered to boys'); see also Amy
Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for Women's Schools, 21 HARV.
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The non-remedial justification of "increasing educational options"
for American students could also be raised. 4 ° The Commonwealth
raised this justification in United States v. Virginia, but the Court
rejected this argument.," The Court did not rule out the possibility
that it could never be "regarded as an important government interest;
this leaves open the possibility that such a justification might be more
successful in a less extreme context than that presented in VMI.'
142
No matter what reasoning is raised, the burden of establishing an
exceedingly persuasive justification will be a difficult one to bear.14
The Commonwealth of Virginia would have to be explicit about its ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification for single-sex education. 44 Likely,
the Commonwealth will have to present empirical evidence of the
benefits of separating the sexes during certain classes."'
VIII. PERPETUATING INFERIORITY
The burden still rests on the State to prove a genuine justifica-
tion that is not based on overbroad generalizations about the capaci-
ties of the genders. 146 Further, they cannot create or perpetuate the
inferiority of women. 147 The justifications proffered will pass a court's
inquiry "as long as they are voluntary, educationally beneficial, allow
alternatives to traditional gender identities and roles and do not
harm women's economic or political status."'48 Interestingly enough,
scholars have suggested separate classes for women in math may also
be "based on stereotypes about girls' underachievement" in those sub-
jects.'49 It is possible that single-sex classes could impact the second
prong set forth in United States v. Virginia.5 °
WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 23 (1998) (noting the history of discrimination against women coupled
with empirical studies revealing single-sex education positively impacts women make it
"soundly within a state's interest to permit a public single-sex school for women, even in
a world" that will not permit an all-male school").
140. Sherwin, supra note 13, at 62.
141. Land, supra note 11, at 318 (noting that educational diversity in state-supported
educational opportunities failed in the VMI case because the Commonwealth only offered
single-sex schools for men and VMI was not chartered for educational diversity).
142. Id.
143. Id. ("[E]ach of the justifications presents its own set of challenges.... the consti-
tutional foundation supporting single-sex schools is hardly firm."); see also Otto, supra note
118, at 357 (In order to survive, a single sex school must first of all be founded for a com-
pelling reason that is related to the exclusion of one sex.").
144. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 418 (noting that schools established under the current
evolution ofjustifications for single-sex education will likely survive intermediate scrutiny).
145. Id. at 420.
146. See SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 177.
147. Id.
148. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 427.
149. Id.
150. SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 177.
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IX. THE STATUTORY STANDARD: TITLE IX
In addition to the constitutional context, public schools must ad-
here to Title IX. 5' Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act passed in 1972
states "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'52 This provision may be "viewed as
the culmination of the long struggle for educational equality for girls
in this country."' 5 This statutory standard must be met in order for
a public school system to maintain its federal funding.'
All state educational systems receive some form of federal fund-
ing,"'55 and Title IX "paints a more complete version of equality than
the Equal Protection Clause."'56 Notably, it does not apply to admis-
sions in non-vocational elementary and secondary schools.1 7 Nor
does it apply to gender-segregated activities such as "any Boys State
conference or Girls State conference," nor to "father-son or mother-
daughter activities at an educational institution."'' 5 These gender-
segregated activities can be maintained so long as "reasonably com-
parable activities" are provided for the excluded sex." 9 Title IX's
vague framework makes it possible for a school district to offer single
sex classes, so long as they are "reasonably comparable" to those of-
fered for the opposite sex. 6 ° The Department of Education deter-
mines, using a variety of factors, whether the educational opportunity
151. 20 U.S. C. §1681(a) (Supp. IV 2005).
152. Id.
153. See Sherwin, supra note 13, at 53 ("[Title IX is] [blest known for its application
to the arena of women's athletic programs.... By conditioning federal funding on a
discrimination-free educational environment, the statute promised to be a powerful tool
for proponents of educational equity.").
154. See SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 171 (stating that "from the legislative language and
subsequent history of Title IX, we can reasonably conclude that neither the statute nor the
regulations cover the admissions policies of public elementary and secondary schools").
155. See U.S. Department of Education, Growth and Contracts Overview, available
at http://www.ed.gov/fund/landing.jhtml?src=ln (indicating sources for public education
funding) (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
156. David Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217,271
(2005).
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2005).
158. Id. § 1681 (a)(8); see also SALOMONE, supra note 8, at 171 (stating these "narrow
exceptions (to Title IX] do not cover any of the core academic subjects, such as math and
science, or computers, all of which have been the focal point of recent single-sex class
initiatives for girls").
159. Id. at § 1681 (a)(8).
160. Jenny L. Matthews, Comment, Admissions Denied: An Examination of a Single-
Sex Public School Initiative in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2032, 2043 (2004).
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afforded to one sex is equal to that offered to the opposite sex.16' Any
school district in the Commonwealth will have to abide not only by
the framework of the Constitution but also to the statutory standards
set out in Title IX.
X. APPLYING THE STANDARD: THE COMMONWEALTH'S
SINGLE-SEX CLASSROOMS
The Code of Virginia mandates that "consistent with constitu-
tional principles, a school board may establish single-sex classes in
public schools of the school division." '162 Many school districts in the
Commonwealth currently separate out the sexes for physical educa-
tion and sexual education classes. 6 ' In addition, six school districts
in the Commonwealth are now offering single-sex classes for elemen-
tary school students in math and science."6
Ironically, the first secondary school in the Commonwealth to
offer single-sex classes, Bailey Bridge Middle School, did not intend
to create single-sex classes for its six graders. 6 ' A random assign-
ment of students to sixth grade classes resulted in several single-sex
classes in subjects other than physical education.'66 Ultimately, the
school decided to keep the classes and continued to offer single-sex
classes. 67 Academic improvement increased among the students
and discipline issues declined. 6 ' Bailey Bridge's mission statement
161. Id. at 2042.
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1:1 (2005). Note that the Virginia Constitution affords
no greater equal protection rights than the United States Constitution. See Archer v.
Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 1973) (indicating the Virginia consti-
tution "is no broader than the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States").
163. Va. Dept. of Educ., Family Life Education (2004), http://www.doe.virginia.gov/
DOE/ studentsrvcs/familylifeguidelines.pdf (noting that sensitive content will be taught
in sex-segregated classrooms).
164. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, supra note 3 (noting that
the schools currently offering single-sex classes in the core academic subjects are: Bailey
Bridge Middle School, Henderson Middle School, Williamsburg Middle School, Achievable
Dream Academy in Newport News, Spratley Middle School, and Patrick Henry Elemen-
tary School).
165. ONLINE NEwSHOuR: Separate Classrooms (PBS television broadcast May 19,2003),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/education/jan-june03/classrooms_05-19.html
("A glitch in the school's computer system resulted in a random assignment of 98 percent
girls to one section of the sixth grade and 98 percent to another, leaving three sections, or
teams, as they're known - coed.").
166. Id.
167. Id. (stating that at times schools must be "unorthodox in the way that you go about
doing things for children," and noting that "if single-gender grouping for some children
will make them the leaders of tomorrow, I'm all for it... ").
168. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, supra note 3.
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indicates it hopes to "work in partnership with students, families,
and the community to ensure the success of each student." '169
In 2003, the Achievable Dream Academy in Newport News and
Henderson Middle School in Richmond began offering single-sex
classes.17 ° The Achievable Dream Academy at Dunbar-Erwin ini-
tially offered a single-sex class for girls in math and science.171 Later,
the principal created a girl's only class for all subjects.'72 These classes
supplemented the school's mission of "provid[ing] a unique [and]
challenging disciplined academic environment" for its students.
173
Henderson Middle School in Richmond offers single-sex sixth and
seventh grade classes in the core subjects.'74 The students are sep-
arated for the core subjects, "while lunch, electives, and physical edu-
cation remain coeducational.' 75 Spratley Middle School in Hampton
Roads and Cedar Lee Middle School in Bealeton both offer single-sex
classes for eighth graders.176 Cedar Lee separates the sexes for English
classes, rather than science and math classes. 177 Williamsburg Middle
School in Arlington offers a "girl's only science" class.'78 Patrick Henry
Middle School in Richmond offers third through fifth grade "boys
only" classes.'79
Several of the Commonwealth's programs have flaws that could
open them up to constitutional challenges. Bailey Bridge Middle
School did not intend to offer single-sex classes, and any challenge
to the school's plan might be able to establish a disingenuous pur-
pose. Offering single-sex classes in English instead of subjects that
traditionally disadvantage women may not be able to establish that
the program meets an exceedingly persuasive justification. None of
the programs rely on remedial justifications. Instead, they all rely
heavily on the different learning styles between the sexes. The
question remains whether a court will find this a compelling state
interest-one that can pass constitutional muster.
169. Bailey Bridge Middle School, available at http://www.chesterfield.kl2.va.us/
SchoolslBaileyBridgeMS/home.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
170. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, supra note 3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Achievable Dream Academy at Dunbar-Erwin,http://dunbar.nn.kl2 .va.us/ (last
visited Apr. 30, 2007).
174. National Association for Single Sex Public Education, supra note 3.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
SINGLE-SEX CLASSROOMS IN THE COMMONWEALTH
CONCLUSION
School districts in the Commonwealth, offering single-sex
education opportunities, must do so under the genuine auspices of
providing the best academic environment possible for their students.
The objective of these single-sex initiatives must be clearly defined
against the backdrop of United States v. Virginia.8 0
The standard articulated in Virginia sought to remedy years of
discrimination against women. 81 Equal protection analysis under
Virginia clarified that the Commonwealth must put forth a justifi-
cation that is both genuine and exceedingly persuasive in order to
withstand constitutional scrutiny.'82 This justification must not be
based on stereotypical assumptions about the sexes.
As the Court stated in Virginia, single-sex education offers peda-
gogical benefits to some students." The No Child Left Behind Act rec-
ognizes single-sex education as a useful pedagogical tool and seeks
to encourage its implementation in classrooms across the country.
Parents should be afforded the choice for the learning environment
that best suits their children.
School districts in the Commonwealth seeking to offer single-sex
educational environments must fulfill their constitutional obligations
under the Equal Protection Clause. The new generation of single-sex
initiatives in the Commonwealth seeks to enhance the academic per-
formance of students by catering to each individual student's learning
style. This seems to be a compelling and genuine state interest. These
programs do not seek to play into the stereotypical assumptions about
the capabilities of the genders. Therefore, the Commonwealth's pur-
suit of single-sex education should be able to withstand a court's con-
stitutional scrutiny.
Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority, noted that Justice
Scalia's dissent saw "fire where there was no flame."'" Nearly ten
years after the Court's opinion in Virginia, the Commonwealth con-
tinues to put forth single-sex opportunities. Despite all predictions,
single-sex education is not dead but continues to thrive and maintains
its constitutionality under the standards articulated in Virginia.
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